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Abstract 
A remarkable feature of the human brain is its ability to make deductions, that is, to infer 
valid conclusions from known information. In part because these deductions play an 
important role in spoken and written communication, it has been postulated that there is a 
close relationship between language and deductive reasoning in humans. Notably, some have 
proposed that deductive reasoning relies on a system of inferential rules that can be compared 
to the grammar of a natural language. Here I review the neuroimaging literature on deductive 
reasoning to evaluate whether there is some overlap between the neuro-cognitive operations 
that enable deduction and those that underlie the syntactic processing of language. Although 
some studies suggest that relatively simple deductions may involve Broca’s area, no study to 
date has demonstrated that the mechanisms supporting the syntactic processing of language 
contribute to deductive reasoning. Implications for future directions in the literature are 
outlined. 
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Abstract (French) 
Une caractéristique remarquable du cerveau humain est sa capacité à faire des déductions, 
c'est-à-dire à déduire des conclusions valides à partir d'informations connues. En partie parce 
que ces déductions jouent un rôle important dans la communication orale et écrite, il a été 
postulé qu'il pourrait exister une relation étroite entre le langage et le raisonnement déductif 
chez l’être humain. Certains ont notamment proposé que le raisonnement déductif reposerait 
sur un système de règles inférentielles qui pourraient être comparées à la grammaire d'un 
langage naturel. Dans cet article, je passe en revue la littérature en neuroimagerie sur le 
raisonnement déductif afin d’évaluer si les opérations neuro-cognitives qui sous-tendent le 
raisonnement déductif sont similaires à celles qui sous-tendent le traitement syntaxique du 
langage. Bien que certaines études suggèrent que des déductions relativement simples 
pourraient reposer sur l’aire de Broca, aucune étude à ce jour n'a démontré que les 
mécanismes soutenant le traitement syntaxique du langage contribuent au raisonnement 
déductif. Les implications de cette revue sur les recherches futures sont mentionnées. 
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(1)  “Jerry was trying to decide what to wear to meet his fiancée’s parents. 
(2) ‘I'd like to wear either my striped or my checkered shirt,’ he thought. 
(3) ‘If I wear my striped shirt, I'll have to wear my blue pants since they match the 
shirt,’ he thought, ‘but I'm not sure where my blue pants are.’ 
(4) He looked in his closet for his checkered shirt and saw that it was wrinkled, so 
he decided he could not wear that. 
(5) ‘So I'd better find my blue pants,’ he thought”  
        (Lea, O'Brien, Fisch, Noveck, & Braine, 1990) 
 
 
Readers do not have much difficulty understanding short stories such as the one above. 
Critical to this capacity are certain logical inferences that are carried out routinely. For example, 
sentence (4) eliminates one of the options from sentence (2), thus allowing the reader to infer 
that Jerry will have to wear his striped shirt (which is information that is never explicitly stated 
in the text). Additionally, the reader needs to integrate this inferred information with sentence 
(3) to understand why Jerry has to find his blue pants. These inferences are necessary for 
understanding the conclusion of the story. 
Such inferences are deductive: a conclusion that follows from them has to be true if the 
premises are true. For example, this is the case for each of the arguments exemplified in Table 
1, which rely on propositional connectives (e.g., modus ponens, modus tollens, disjunction 
elimination), linear relations, and inclusion of sets. Deductive reasoning is at the core of many 
of our cultural and scientific practices, including mathematics (Michal & Ruhama, 2008; Nunes 
et al., 2007), law (Ellsworth, Holyoak, & Morrison Jr, 2005) and medicine (Wulff, 1986). 
Deductive inferences play an important role in argumentation (Mercier & Sperber, 2011) and, 
as the story above illustrates, are made rather automatically when processing written discourse 
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(Lea, 1995). In fact, spontaneous deductive inferences are central, not only to written 
communication but to discourse generally. They are particularly critical to spoken discourse 
because speakers have to be understood on the fly (and thus inferences have to be made as 
sentences are spoken). For instance, a propositional inference such as modus ponens (see Table 
1) is so automatic that it may be carried out without reasoners even being aware of it (Reverberi, 
Shallice, D'Agostini, Skrap, & Bonatti, 2009). Thus, many of the deductive inferences that 
people make are likely to be drawn automatically in understanding discourse, whether written 
or spoken. This suggests that one of the most important functions of deductive reasoning is to 
facilitate verbal interaction (Braine, 1990). 
 
---------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
The hypothesis of deductive reasoning as a rule-based process 
Based on the observations above, several researchers have postulated a close 
relationship between language and deductive reasoning in humans. For example, Polk and 
Newell have claimed that “the central processes in deductive reasoning are linguistic” because 
they involve a verbal encoding of the premises into some kind of internal representation (Polk 
& Newell, 1995). But it is possible that processes akin to those involved in natural language are 
engaged well after this initial verbal encoding of the premises. Indeed, two important theories 
of human deductive reasoning -- PSYCOP (Rips, 1994) and the Mental Logic (Braine & 
O'Brien, 1998) – posit that the core operations of deduction may rely on a system of content-
free rules. These theories, which are rooted in the Aristotelian idea that the mind possesses 
some kind of innate mental logic, rely on the assumption that formal rules are used to infer a 
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conclusion from premises in a way that takes into account only their form (not their meaning). 
In some ways, these rules can be compared to the grammar of a natural language. In other 
words, this formal rule approach sees deductive reasoning as emerging from our ability to 
combine discrete structural elements into sequences, given a limited set of rules. Much like 
grammatical rules are applied to words to construct sentences, logical rules may be applied to 
a propositional representation of the premises to infer conclusions (Braine & O'Brien, 1998; 
Rips, 1994). Basic inferential rules would involve (at least) the basic propositions and, if and 
or. For example, the 12 elementary rules (also called schemas) proposed by the Mental Logic 
are represented in Table 2 (Braine & O'Brien, 1998).  
 
---------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
How would this system of rules be used to draw deductive inferences? Consider for 
instance the Modus Ponens argument in Table 1. The rule [If P then Q; P; therefore Q] (schema 
7 in Table 2) would be applied to the major premise If there is a circle then there is a triangle 
and the minor premise There is a circle to infer the conclusion There is a triangle. Similarly, 
in the case of the disjunction elimination argument in Table 1, the rule [P or Q; not-P; therefore 
Q] (schema 3 in Table 2) would be applied to the major premise There is a circle or there is a 
triangle and the minor premise There is not a circle to infer the conclusion There is a triangle. 
However, understanding more complex arguments such as Modus Tollens would require 
several cognitive steps. This is because the rule [If P then Q; not-Q; therefore not-P] is not 
believed to be part of the basic deductive competence (which is the reason why it is missing 
from Table 2). In such cases, strategies that are not universally available can be applied so that 
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reasoners can go beyond their basic competence (e.g., strategies involving reductio ad 
absurdum: If circle were true, then triangle would have to be true, but triangle is false, so circle 
must be false).  
In principle, one can extend this formal rule approach to relational premises as well. 
This would require incorporating axioms for transitivity, or meaning postulates, to the set of 
rules (Goodwin & Johnson-Laird, 2005; Hagert, 1984; Johnson-Laird, 2010). For example, the 
relation is larger than might be associated with the transitive inferences below: 
 
If x is larger than y, and y is larger than z, then x is larger than z. 
 
Such inferences can easily be applied to premises such as The circle is larger than the 
triangle and The triangle is larger than the square to derive the conclusion The circle larger 
the square in Table 1. 
Finally, rules could also be applied to categorical arguments. This might be done by 
assuming that the repertoire of formal rules extend to those that involve quantifiers (Braine, 
1998), or by assuming that there are rules that transform categorical premises into quantifier-
free representations prior to syntactic manipulation (Rips, 1994). Consider for example the 
categorical argument at the bottom of Table 1. The premise All tables are triangles and All 
triangles are blue could be transformed into the premises If x is a table then x is a triangle and 
If x is a triangle then x is blue. Integrating these now-propositional premises would lead to the 
quantifier-free conclusion If x is a table then x is blue. Another rule might re-introduce the 
quantifier so that the conclusion would be translated into All tables are blue.  
 
Deductive reasoning and the syntax of language: Common or different mechanisms?   
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The hypothesis that deductive reasoning may rely on content-free rules prompts an 
intriguing question: Does deductive reasoning make use of some of the syntactic machinery 
that is used to produce sentences in natural language? As argued elsewhere, this question is 
fundamental because it pertains to the long-standing idea that human thought might be 
embedded in language (e.g., Monti & Osherson, 2012). It is important to emphasize, however, 
that this idea is far from trivial in the cognitive literature, at least for two reasons.  
First, over the past two decades or so, the idea that deductive reasoning would rely on 
rules of inference has been seriously challenged. For example, Johnson-Laird and colleagues 
(Johnson-Laird, 1999) have famously argued that deductive reasoning is not a rule-based 
process, but rather a process that involves the manipulation of a representation of the premises 
in spatial working memory. This popular theory, called the Mental Model Theory of 
reasoning, does not assume any role for rule-based representations in deduction. More 
recently, it has also been claimed that people use everyday probabilistic reasoning when 
making deductive inferences (Oaksford, 2015; Oaksford & Chater, 2001, 2007). As such, this 
probabilistic view of deductive reasoning also denies the existence of a content-free rules of 
inference.  
Second, even if one assumes that formal rules may underlie deductive reasoning, this 
does not necessarily mean that deductive reasoning and language rely on the same syntactic 
processes. For instance, as argued by Parsons & Osherson (2001, p. 963), “the language that 
supports deduction […] need not be a natural language like English, burdened as it is by 
ambiguity and ellipsis. Deduction (as well as other forms of reasoning) might rather be 
performed in a format that is antecedent to natural language, the latter being acquired for the 
purpose of expressing meanings that exist prior to their linguistic expression”. In other words, 
it is entirely possible that deductive reasoning may be licensed by content-free rules relying 
on syntactic processes that are distinct from those supporting natural language. More 
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generally, this harks back to the broader question of whether there exist some generalized 
mechanisms that govern all syntactically structured domains, such as language, math, music, 
or reasoning (Fadiga, Craighero, & D’Ausilio, 2009; Monti, 2017; Tettamanti & Weniger, 
2006). Therefore, although evidence that deductive reasoning and the syntax of natural 
language rely on common mechanisms would arguably provide support for the formal rule 
approach to reasoning, evidence to the contrary would not necessarily mean that deductive 
reasoning is not a rule-based process. 
Bearing this context in mind, neuroimaging studies appear uniquely suited to test 
whether deductive reasoning makes use of some of the syntactic processes supporting natural 
language. Indeed, there is a long-standing literature investigating the neural bases of syntactic 
processing in natural language. Perhaps the brain region that has been the most consistently 
associated with such processing is Broca’s area (i.e., the brain region that corresponds to 
Brodmann areas, or BAs, 45 and 44) (Friederici & Kotz, 2003; Grodzinsky & Santi, 2008; 
Ullman, 2001). For example, studies have demonstrated enhanced activity in Broca’s area when 
syntactically complex sentences (e.g., The juice that the child spilled stained the rug) are 
compared to syntactically simple sentences (e.g., The child spilled the juice that stained the 
rug) (Ben-Shachar, Hendler, Kahn, Ben-Bashat, & Grodzinsky, 2003; Friederici, Fiebach, 
Schlesewsky, Bornkessel, & von Cramon, 2006; Roder, Stock, Neville, Bien, & Rosler, 2002; 
Stromswold, Caplan, Alpert, & Rauch, 1996), or when syntactic violations are detected (e.g., 
The shirt was on ironed vs. The shirt was ironed) (Friederici, Ruschemeyer, Hahne, & Fiebach, 
2003; Meyer, Friederici, & von Cramon, 2000). Grodzinsky and colleagues have suggested that 
activation of Broca’s area is sensitive to the amount of syntactic movement (the displacement 
of an argument from its canonical position) in a sentence. For example, a sentence involving a 
lot of syntactic movement such as The mother of Jim loves the woman who the mailman and 
Kate burnt elicits more activity in Broca’s area than a sentence associated with less syntactic 
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movement such as The mailman and the mother of Jim love the woman who Kate burnt (Ben-
Shachar et al., 2003; Ben-Shachar, Palti, & Grodzinsky, 2004; Grodzinsky & Santi, 2008). In 
line with these neuroimaging findings, patients with lesion in Broca’s area cannot understand 
sentences with movement but understand sentences without movement (Grodzinsky & Santi, 
2008). Overall, and although other regions have been associated with syntactic processing in 
the literature (e.g., the superior temporal gyrus, Friederici & Kotz, 2003), there is ample 
evidence that syntactic processing in natural language is primarily supported by Broca’s area. 
This makes this region a prime candidate for a potential overlap between deductive reasoning 
and the syntax of language. 
The goal of the present review is to examine the hypothesis that deductive reasoning is 
associated with enhanced activity in brain areas that are also involved in the syntactic 
processing of language (and especially Broca’s area). In what follows, I first describe some 
common features of the paradigms that are typically used to study the neural bases of deductive 
reasoning. In doing so, I want to draw the reader’s attention on some methodological issues and 
caveats associated with these neuroimaging studies. These issues are important to keep in mind 
when interpreting the results of neuroimaging studies. I then turn to the neuroimaging literature 
investigating deductive reasoning in the absence of tasks investigating linguistic processing. 
These studies include early investigations focusing on the conclusion processing stage of a 
deductive argument, as well as a set of more recent studies focusing on the premise processing 
stage. Finally, I review more recent studies that have focused on directly comparing brain 
activity associated with deductive reasoning and linguistic processing. 
 
Some issues and caveat when investigating the neural bases of deductive reasoning 
In a typical neuroimaging experiment on deductive reasoning, participants are visually 
or auditorily presented with 2 to 3 premises, followed by a conclusion (see Fig. 1). The task 
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typically requires participants to evaluate whether that conclusion follows out of necessity from 
the premises. Although such a design might not appear that different from designs that are used 
in behavioral studies, the neuroimaging environment requires some adaptations to be made to 
standard paradigms. This may give rise to issues that have to be taken into consideration when 
assessing results from neuroimaging studies. I will highlight here four of the most important 
issues (see also Monti & Osherson, 2012; Monti, Osherson, Martinez, & Parsons, 2007; Prado, 
Chadha, & Booth, 2011; Reverberi et al., 2007; Reverberi, Rusconi, Paulesu, & Cherubini, 
2009). 
 
---------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
First, whereas behavioral studies typically present a large number of participants with 
one (or a few) reasoning problems to solve, neuroimaging experiments typically present a 
limited number of participants (e.g., between 15 to 20 participants) with a large number of trials 
(e.g., from 20 to 40 trials). Although this is done to maximize signal-to-noise ratio, this strategy 
may come with some experimental complications. For instance, by the end of the neuroimaging 
session, participants may develop strong expectations regarding the task and may employ 
memory or heuristic strategies to solve problems (rather than genuine reasoning; Reverberi et 
al., 2009). This confound may be especially prevalent in studies that extensively train 
participants on the reasoning task before even entering into the scanner (generally to maximize 
accuracy or to select participants based on their performance). A typical strategy to limit this 
bias is to make the task as varied as possible. For instance, participants may be presented with 
filler trials as well as with a variety of logical forms (Mathieu, Booth, & Prado, 2015; Prado et 
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al., 2015; Prado, Van Der Henst, & Noveck, 2010; Schwartz, Epinat-Duclos, Léone, & Prado, 
2017).  
Second, it is important to emphasize that any results from a brain imaging experiment 
need to be interpreted as a difference in activity between two cognitive states. That is, activity 
associated with deductive reasoning is always measured relative to a control or baseline 
condition. In some cases, this baseline may be a “low-level” control condition such as a fixation 
cross (which would then correspond to some sort of resting state). Of course, any activity 
associated with solving a deductive argument compared to such a resting state may be 
confounded by activity associated with reading the argument or selecting a response (which are 
processes that are not controlled for by the simple perception of a fixation cross). Therefore, 
such contrasts are not particularly useful when evaluating whether deductive reasoning involves 
linguistic processes that go beyond the mere reading of a triplet of sentences. More informative 
are undoubtedly contrasts in which activity associated with reading and response selection is 
subtracted out from activity associated with evaluating a deductive argument. Researchers have 
used a variety of such “high-level” baseline conditions across studies. For example, some have 
used arguments in which premises and/or conclusions are not related to one another (Goel, 
Buchel, Frith, & Dolan, 2000; Goel & Dolan, 2001, 2004), arguments in which the conclusion 
is the repetition of one premise (Noveck, Goel, & Smith, 2004), or arguments that are easier to 
process than the type of arguments that is investigated (Monti et al., 2007; Prado, Mutreja, & 
Booth, 2013). This is not to say that all of these “high-level” control conditions lead to the exact 
same interpretations regarding the effects observed. Variations in these control conditions also 
need to be taken into consideration when interpreting results. However, “high-level” baselines 
controlling for processes such as reading are a bare minimum when assessing the hypothesis 
that deductive reasoning may rely on the neural substrates of syntactic processing in language.  
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Third, although behavioral investigations of deductive reasoning are mainly concerned 
with whether a conclusion is endorsed or not, neuroimaging studies are interested in what type 
of brain activity is associated with deductive reasoning. Reasoning, however, is a complex 
process that is diffuse and somewhat difficult to pinpoint temporarily. At what point during the 
processing of a deductive argument should we expect reasoning-related activity? While most 
researchers have focused on brain activity associated with the conclusion (Goel et al., 2000; 
Goel & Dolan, 2001, 2003, 2004; Monti et al., 2007; Monti, Parsons, & Osherson, 2009; 
Noveck et al., 2004; Stollstorff, Vartanian, & Goel, 2012), others have argued that an inference 
is made as soon as the second premise appears and can be integrated with the first premise 
(Prado et al., 2010; Reverberi et al., 2012; Reverberi et al., 2010; Reverberi et al., 2007). 
Therefore, some studies have specifically investigated brain activity elicited by the second 
premise rather than the conclusion. Of course, there is no right or wrong answer to the question 
of when reasoning occurs. But it is important to keep in mind that studies vary in terms of 
conceptual choices made by the experimenters. 
Fourth, as exemplified in Table 1, deductive argument may come in many forms. While 
all deductive arguments have in common the central feature that a conclusion follows out of 
necessity from the premises, multiple logical forms have rarely been used and compared in one 
single study. In other words, it is possible that the results obtained in one study using a specific 
logical form (e.g., propositional reasoning) may not translate to another study using a different 
form (e.g., relational reasoning). The idea that different forms of reasoning would rely on 
different types of mechanisms was in fact acknowledged by proponents of a formal rule 
approach of reasoning, who for example argued that “mental models in some form also provide 
a tool available to the human reasoning. Constructing models seems an intuitively natural way 
of solving the kind of spatial problems discussed by Johnson-Laird and Byrne” (Braine & 
O'Brien, 1998, p.193-194). Thus, it is possible that different types of logical arguments may be 
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associated with different types of brain mechanisms. Inter-study variability in terms of logical 
forms also needs to be kept in mind. 
Overall, neuroimaging investigations of deductive reasoning come with a number of 
methodological and conceptual questions that experimenters have to face. As pointed out by 
Vinod Goel, a pioneer in the neuroimaging study of deductive reasoning, “there are no 
absolutely right or wrong answers to these and other similar issues. In making these decisions 
and compromises it is advisable to pay as much attention to the neuroscience as to the cognitive 
theory” (Goel, 2007). In the following, I will try to keep these issues in mind when reviewing 
relevant studies. 
 
Evidence for reliance on linguistic processing in early neuroimaging studies focusing on 
the conclusion processing stage of a deductive argument 
The hypothesis that deductive reasoning may rely on brain regions supporting linguistic 
processing was already at the center of the very first positron emission tomography (PET) study 
on deductive reasoning 20 years ago (Goel, Gold, Kapur, & Houle, 1997). At the time, Goel 
and colleagues posited that, according to a formal rule approach, “deductive reasoning, being a 
formal, rule-governed process defined over the structure of language, will activate the left 
hemisphere more than the right hemisphere and will implicate some of the same structures 
involved in language processing” (p. 1306). Comparing deductive arguments (including 
categorical and propositional syllogisms) to a baseline condition in which participants had to 
determine how many of the sentences in an argument had people as subject, the authors did find 
enhanced activity in Broca’s area (BA 45). This was interpreted as evidence for the idea that 
deductive reasoning may be supported by linguistic mechanisms. However, activity in Broca’s 
area has not systematically been observed in subsequent neuroimaging studies of deductive 
reasoning.  
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On the one hand, while employing relatively similar experimental materials, Goel and 
colleagues replicated this engagement of Broca’s area in deductive reasoning in follow-up 
studies using PET (Goel, Gold, Kapur, & Houle, 1998) and functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) (Goel et al., 2000). On the other hand, several other studies have failed to 
uncover activity in Broca’s area during deductive reasoning. For example, comparing deductive 
reasoning to a language comprehension task involving the exact same arguments, neither 
Osherson et al. (1998) nor Parsons & Osherson (2001) reported activity in either left BA 45 or 
BA 44. Using relational arguments such as “Karen is in front of Larry, Larry is in front of Jane, 
Is Karen in front of Jane?”, Goel & Dolan (2001) and Goel, Makale, & Grafman (2004) found 
enhanced activity in the parietal cortex but not in Broca’s area. Other neuroimaging studies 
employing relational arguments have also failed to find involvement of Broca’s area, instead 
reporting activity in the posterior parietal cortices (Knauff, Fangmeier, Ruff, & Johnson-Laird, 
2003; Knauff, Mulack, Kassubek, Salih, & Greenlee, 2002; Prado et al., 2010; Ruff, Knauff, 
Fangmeier, & Spreer, 2003). Given the role of the posterior parietal cortex in spatial processing, 
these results are more consistent with the idea that relational premises are mapped onto spatial 
mental models than with the idea that it relies on formal rules (which was a possibility 
acknowledged by Mental Logic theorists, Braine & O'Brien, 1998). But perhaps more 
surprising were the results of the first fMRI study that specifically investigated the neural bases 
of conditional arguments, such as Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens (see Table 1). Noveck et 
al. (2004) did not report any activity in either left BA 44 or 45 when such conditional arguments 
(arguably at the heart of the Mental Logic theory, see Table 2) were compared to baseline 
arguments in which the conclusion was the repetition of a non-overlapping premise (If P then 
Q, R, therefore R). Instead, enhanced activity was found in more dorsal fronto-parietal regions 
(Noveck et al., 2004).  
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Overall, early neuroimaging studies provide equivocal evidence for the involvement of 
Broca’s area in deductive reasoning. It is clear that there is some variability between studies, 
which may come from a number of different sources. First, the type of deductive argument 
appears to matter. For example, relational arguments are less likely to activate Broca’s area that 
other types of arguments. This was confirmed by a quantitative meta-analysis of the 
neuroimaging literature on deductive reasoning performed a few years ago (Prado et al., 2011). 
Compared to studies that specifically investigated the neural bases of categorical or 
propositional arguments, studies that focused on relational arguments tended to find consistent 
activation in the posterior parietal cortex rather than Broca’s area. In contrast, this meta-analysis 
found consistent activation of Broca’s area across studies that investigated categorical 
arguments (propositional arguments were found to involve a more dorsal fronto-parietal 
network).  
Second, the studies discussed here all employ control conditions in which sentences are 
presented to participants. However, as argued elsewhere (Monti & Osherson, 2012), the amount 
of linguistic processing required to process these “control” sentences may not always be similar 
to the amount of linguistic processing that is required when participants have to carefully read 
premises and conclusions to determine the logical validity of an argument. For instance, early 
studies in which involvement of Broca’s area has been found employed baseline tasks in which 
participants simply had to determine how many sentences have people as subjects (Goel et al., 
1997, 1998). Other studies have used conclusions that were entirely unrelated to the previous 
premises (Goel et al., 2000). Because sentences in all of those tasks may not be read with the 
same depth as deductive arguments, any activity observed in Broca’s area may be related to 
differences in terms of reading demands rather than in terms of reasoning per se (Monti & 
Osherson, 2012).  
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Third, as mentioned earlier, reasoning is a diffuse process that is difficult to isolate 
temporarily. Studies have relied on different assumptions regarding the exact moment an 
inference may be best captured. For instance, some studies have used block designs capturing 
brain activity throughout an entire argument (and even a set of arguments) (Goel et al., 1997, 
1998; Osherson et al., 1998; Parsons & Osherson, 2001), whereas others have modeled brain 
activity starting from the onset of the conclusion (Goel et al., 2000; Goel & Dolan, 2001; 
Noveck et al., 2004) or halfway between the onset of the conclusion and the response (Goel & 
Dolan, 2003, 2004). It is even possible that studies have missed the critical moment an inference 
is made. Specifically, Carlo Reverberi and his colleagues argued that, in theory, an inference 
can be drawn as soon as the second premise is available and can be integrated with the first 
premise (Reverberi et al., 2007). For example, the conclusion There is triangle can be inferred 
as soon as the premises If there is a square then there is triangle and There is square are 
available to a reasoner. Reverberi and colleagues conducted a series of recent studies based on 
this assumption. 
 
Evidence for reliance on linguistic processing in neuroimaging studies focusing on the 
premise processing stage of a deductive argument 
In two studies in which fMRI activity was measured from the onset of this second 
premise (and compared to activity associated with a premise that could not be integrated), 
Reverberi and colleagues found enhanced activity in Broca’s area (left BAs 44 and 45), both in 
the case of propositional (Reverberi et al., 2007) and categorical arguments (Reverberi et al., 
2010). In another study focusing on inter-individual differences, Reverberi et al. (2012) further 
found that activity in Broca’s area predicted participants’ sensitivity to the logical structure of 
a problem (i.e., how consistent participants were when responding to problems that were 
superficially different but logically similar). These results led Reverberi and colleagues to 
	 18	
suggest that Broca’s area (together with more dorsal and medial frontal regions) may be 
“involved in extraction and representation of the formal structure of problems” (p. 1763). 
Importantly, the authors did not suggest that this region would act in isolation, but rather in co-
operation with a more ventral area (left BA 47) that would be involved in selecting and applying 
logical rules. 
Recently, the involvement of Broca’s area in the fundamental operations of deduction 
has further been corroborated by Baggio et al. (2016). In that study, the authors used 
multivariate pattern analysis to uncover the neural representation of compounds based on the 
logical connectives and, if, and or. The results show that Broca’s area is involved in 
representing both the surface form and the full logical meaning of these compounds. This led 
Baggio et al. (2016) to suggest that there is a “shared neural foundation for the cognitive science 
of language and reasoning” (p. 309).  
Results from this set of studies are certainly intriguing and lend some support for the 
idea that Broca’s area may be involved in some aspects of deductive reasoning. However, they 
suffer from an important caveat. In none of these studies were the brain mechanisms supporting 
syntactic processing in language formally identified. This is problematic because, even if there 
is little doubt that Broca’s area is involved in syntactic processing (Friederici, 2012; Friederici 
& Kotz, 2003; Grodzinsky & Friederici, 2006), it is also involved in other linguistic functions 
such as phonological and semantic processing (Vigneau et al., 2006)1. In fact, Broca’s area may 
even support functions that appear unrelated to linguistic or syntactic processing, such as visual 
search (Manjaly et al., 2005), action recognition (Hamzei et al., 2003), movement preparation 
(Thoenissen, Zilles, & Toni, 2002), verbal working-memory (Chein, Fissell, Jacobs, & Fiez, 
2002; Rogalsky, Matchin, & Hickok, 2008), and the processing of ordered information (Van 
																																																								
1 Note, however, that the semantic complexity of a sentence is typically related to its syntactic 
complexity (Pylkkänen, Brennan, & Bemis, 2011). Therefore, studies focusing on semantic processing 
might have syntactic confounds. 
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Opstal, Fias, Peigneux, & Verguts, 2009). Therefore, before drawing any conclusion about a 
link between linguistic processing and deductive reasoning in Broca’s area, it is important to 
formally compare both types of processing within the same participants. I will now turn to 
studies that precisely investigated this overlap (or lack thereof). 
 
Evidence for reliance on linguistic processing in neuroimaging studies directly comparing 
brain activity associated with deductive reasoning and linguistic processing 
Monti et al. (2007) were the first to examine brain activity associated with deductive 
reasoning and brain activity associated with linguistic processing within the same study. To 
identify the neural correlates of deductive reasoning, the authors compared fMRI activity 
associated with evaluating propositional arguments in the form of Modus Tollens to activity 
associated with evaluating propositional arguments in the form of Modus Ponens (see Table 
1). Because conclusions in Modus Tollens arguments are typically more difficult to evaluate 
than conclusions in Modus Ponens arguments, the authors argued that such a contrast provides 
an index of “reasoning load” that can be used to identify brain regions supporting deductive 
reasoning. To uncover the neural correlates of linguistic processing, activity associated with 
reading the first premise of each argument was contrasted to fixation. As expected, this latter 
contrast was associated with enhanced activity in several frontal, temporal and parietal regions 
typically associated with reading (including Broca’s area). More surprising, however, was the 
fact that very little overlap was observed between these reading-related brain regions and the 
brain network identified in the contrast of Modus Tollens versus Modus Ponens arguments. 
That is, more activity for Modus Tollens than Modus Ponens was found in a fronto-parietal 
network that included the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (RLPFC), the medial frontal gyrus, and 
the posterior parietal cortex. In none of these regions did the authors observed reading-related 
activity. Overall, these findings (which were replicated across different versions of the task and 
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different participants in Monti et al., 2007) appear to provide some evidence for a dissociation 
between reasoning and linguistic processing.2  
This dissociation between reasoning and linguistic processing was also partially 
observed in Prado et al. (2013). In that study, we also aimed to formally identify the brain 
regions subserving linguistic processing and deductive reasoning within the same participants. 
Unlike Monti et al. (2007), however, we used an independent word rhyming task as a localizer 
of the neural mechanisms underlying linguistic processing. For each subject, we identified the 
specific voxels of Broca’s area in which enhanced activity was observed in the rhyming task. 
Similar to Monti et al. (2007), we used a “reasoning load” approach to test whether enhanced 
activity could be observed in those voxels during a reasoning task. Specifically, we compared 
brain activity associated with evaluating a conclusion relying on 3 categorical premises (e.g., 
All As are Bs, All Bs are Cs, All Cs are Ds, therefore All As are Ds) to brain activity associated 
with evaluating a conclusion relying on 2 categorical premises (e.g., All As are Bs, All Bs are 
Cs, All Cs are Ds, therefore All As are Cs). When only considering the voxels that were 
activated in the rhyming task in Broca’s area, we did find more activity for conclusions relying 
on 3 premises as compared to conclusion relying on 2 premises. In other words, there was some 
overlap between the rhyming and the reasoning task in Broca’s area. However, there was also 
some important differences between the brain systems supporting reasoning and linguistic 
processing. First, more activity for conclusions relying on 3 categorical premises as compared 
to conclusion relying on 2 categorical premises was found in a region of the RLPFC that was 
not involved in the rhyming task. Second, no overlap between the rhyming and the reasoning 
task was observed in Broca’s area when categorical relations were replaced by linear relations 
(e.g., A is taller than B, B is taller than C, C is taller than D, therefore A is taller than D). For 																																																								
2 Activity in a brain network similar to that uncovered in (Monti et al., 2007) was also found in 
(Rodriguez-Moreno & Hirsch, 2009). In particular, using categorical syllogisms instead of 
propositional statements, the authors did not find reasoning-related activity in left BA 44 or 45. 
However, there was not task aimed at localizing linguistic processing in that study.    
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both categorical and relational arguments, however, the number of premises did modulate 
activity in the RLPFC. Therefore, it is possible that the involvement of Broca’s area in 
deductive reasoning may have more to do with task-specific demands than with the recruitment 
of content-free rules of inference. For example, it has been argued that categorical relations 
may rely to a greater extent on verbal working-memory than linear relations because categories 
are more difficult to map onto a unified representation (Favrel & Barrouillet, 2000). To some 
extent, it is possible that a greater reliance on verbal working memory accounts for the enhanced 
activity in Broca’s area in categorical reasoning tasks (see also Mathieu et al., 2015, for a 
replication of the association between categorical argument and verbal processing in children). 
It is important to point out, however, that neither Prado et al. (2013) nor Monti et al. 
(2007) provide a straightforward test of whether deductive reasoning relies on formal rules of 
inference similar to those underlying natural language. This is because these studies identified 
the regions involved in linguistic processing, but not the neural mechanisms specifically 
supporting syntactic processing in language. A more direct comparison between deductive 
reasoning and the syntax of language was provided by another study from Monti and 
colleagues, using a particularly clever design (Monti et al., 2009). In that study, participants 
were presented with arguments that the authors classified as either ‘logical’ or ‘linguistic’. Both 
types of arguments involved a premise and a conclusion. They also contained the same 3 
elements (X, Y and Z). However, logical and linguistic arguments differed with regards to the 
kind of inference that was required to assess whether the conclusion was valid or not. Logical 
arguments were deductive arguments relying on propositional logic. For example, a logical 
argument was “If both X and Z then not Y, therefore If Y then either not X or not Z”. Evaluating 
the validity of such an argument requires participants to make a logical inference based on an 
understanding of the meaning of the sentential connectives if … then, and, or, and not. 
Linguistic arguments, however, were based on ditransitive verbs such as give, say or take. For 
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example, a linguistic argument was “It was X that Y saw Z take, therefore Z was seen by Y 
taking X”. Evaluating the validity of such an argument does not rely on a logical inference. 
Rather, it requires participants to perform a syntactic transformation of the sentences. In sum, 
comparing brain activity associated with logical and linguistic arguments provides a fairly 
direct test of whether logical inferences and syntactic processing in language rely on the same 
set of brain regions. The results indicate that, compared to similar arguments evaluated for 
grammatical correctness, linguistic and logical arguments elicited enhanced activity in largely 
separated brain networks. On the one hand, linguistic arguments relied on frontal, temporal and 
parietal brain regions encompassing Broca’s area and Wernicke’s area. On the other hand, 
logical arguments relied on a more restricted sets of brain regions that included the RLPFC and 
the medial frontal gyrus. Notably, logical arguments were not associated with any specific 
activity in clusters of the Broca’s area that were involved in linguistic arguments. Thus, the 
authors concluded that “logical inference is not embedded in natural language” (Monti et al., 
2009, p. 12554).  
 
The interaction between deductive reasoning and linguistic processing: Putting the pieces 
of the puzzle together  
 It appears relatively clear from the studies above that deductive reasoning does not 
always rely on the brain regions supporting linguistic (and especially syntactic) processing. At 
the very least, several studies show that dissociations can be found between the mechanisms 
underlying some deductive tasks and those supporting language processing. This arguably 
weakens the claim that deductive reasoning relies on the neural machinery supporting syntactic 
processing in natural language. Instead, it supports the view that deductive reasoning can 
operate independently from linguistic mechanisms (Monti & Osherson, 2012). Nevertheless, 
several studies reviewed here have found Broca’s area to be involved in some deductive 
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reasoning tasks (Goel et al., 2000; Goel et al., 1997, 1998; Reverberi et al., 2012; Reverberi et 
al., 2010; Reverberi et al., 2007). Although some of these results may be driven by baseline 
issues (e.g., some studies may have employed control conditions that are not entirely matched 
with experimental conditions in terms of reading demands, see Monti & Osherson, 2012), not 
all studies have experimental shortcomings and their findings have to be taken into account. 
Overall, I would argue that there are two main ways to explain the involvement of Broca’s area 
in these studies.  
First, it is possible that any activity in Broca’s area during deductive reasoning may 
reflect some domain-general processes that are not necessarily related to syntactic processing 
per se. For example, deductive reasoning is likely to rely on verbal working-memory or the 
processing of ordered information, two cognitive skills that have been associated with Broca’s 
area (Chein et al., 2002; Chein, Ravizza, & Fiez, 2003; Van Opstal et al., 2009). This may 
explain the increased activity in Broca’s area observed as a function of the number of premises 
in Prado et al. (2013). The fact that deductive reasoning may tax some domain-general 
mechanisms that are also be involved in linguistic processing has been acknowledged by Monti 
and colleagues (Monti et al., 2007). Specifically, these authors have argued that deductive 
reasoning is supported by a brain network that can be decomposed into core (i.e., domain-
specific) and support (i.e., domain-general) areas. Even though Broca’s area is not necessarily 
part of the support network highlighted by Monti et al. (2007), it remains possible that 
reasoning-related activity in that region reflects such a support role in making deductive 
inferences.    
A second possibility is that the involvement of Broca’s area in reasoning studies reflects 
activity related to syntactic processing that may be task-dependent. In fact, an examination of 
the type of deductive tasks used in studies that did versus did not find involvement of Broca’s 
area suggests some interesting differences in experimental materials. On the one hand, most of 
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the studies that have found involvement of Broca’s area tend to have used arguments that are 
relatively simple and would require the application of one or two basic rules of inference 
according to the Mental Logic (see Table 2 and red focii in Fig. 2). For instance, Reverberi et 
al. (2007) presented participants with simple arguments based on the forms Modus Ponens and 
disjunction elimination. Reverberi et al. (2010) also used simple conditional and categorical 
arguments that could be solved by the application of basic schemas (Braine & O'Brien, 1998).  
 
---------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
On the other hand, studies that have found reasoning-related activity outside of Broca’s 
area tend to have used tasks that are more complex and would require the application and 
coordination of several rules of inference (see Table 2 and blue focii in Fig. 2). For instance, 
Monti et al. (2007) investigated Modus Tollens arguments. As mentioned earlier, Modus 
Tollens is not an inference that is believed to be part of the basic deductive competence 
according to the Mental Logic (see Table 2). Understanding such arguments would thus call 
upon a reasoning strategy involving the coordination of several cognitive steps, known as 
reduction ad absurdum. Monti et al. (2009) used even more complex arguments embedding 
disjunctions within Modus Tollens forms. Finally, Prado et al. (2013) found reasoning-related 
activity outside of Broca’s area while using arguments that required the coordination of 3 
premises (as compared to 2). In sum, it may be that the complexity of the deductive task is a 
relevant factor when explaining different patterns of activations in the literature. From a neuro-
cognitive point of view, an increase in the complexity of a deductive argument is associated 
with an increase in at least 2 components: the number of relations that have to be considered 
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simultaneously and the working memory load. For example, Modus Tollens arguments 
typically require reasoners to maintain and manipulate several relations in working memory. 
Arguments with 3 premises also arguably require reasoners to consider and maintain in working 
memory more relations than arguments with 2 premises.3 
Recently, Coetzee & Monti (2018) tested whether activity outside of Broca’s area (e.g., 
in the RLPFC) during deductive reasoning could be attributed to an increase in working 
memory load. That is, the authors set out to compare the brain regions sensitive to an increase 
in deductive complexity to the brain regions sensitive to an increase in working memory 
demands. Participants were presented with propositional arguments that were either of the 
Modus Tollens or Modus Ponens form (see Table 1). In the deductive task, arguments had to 
be evaluated for logical validity. Similar to Monti et al. (2007), the contrast of Modus Tollens 
arguments (i.e., complex deductive trials) versus Modus Ponens arguments (i.e., simple 
deductive trials) provided an index of deductive complexity. In the working memory task, 
premises and conclusion either had to be maintained in memory (i.e., simple working memory 
trials) or mentally manipulated (i.e., complex working memory trials) for a subsequent 
recognition test. The contrast of complex versus simple working memory trials provided an 
index of working memory demands. The results indicated a crossover interaction between 
complexity (simple versus complex) and task (deductive versus working memory). That is, 
whereas deductive complexity modulated activity outside of Broca’s area (i.e, in the RLPFC) 
to a greater extent than working memory complexity, working memory complexity modulated 
activity in the posterior parietal cortex to a greater extent than deductive complexity. In other 
																																																								
3 This notion of complexity in the domain of reasoning (e.g., an increase in number of logical relations 
to be considered) differs from the notion of complexity in the linguistic domain. For example, 
syntactic complexity in the linguistic domain typically refers to factors such as number of embeddings 
and number of movement operations (Santi & Grodzinsky, 2010). Importantly, studies have found that 
increasing the syntactic complexity of sentences is associated with changes of activity within (rather 
than outside of) Broca’s area. Therefore, the notion of complexity itself is unlikely to generalize over 
language and reasoning.   
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words, increased activity in the RLPFC as a function of deductive complexity does not appear 
to be accounted for by an increase in working-memory demands. These findings suggest that 
activation outside of Broca’s area in deductive reasoning studies cannot be merely explained 
by the complexity of stimuli in terms of working memory.  
Coetzee & Monti (2018)’s results may rule out one important hypothesis concerning the 
involvement of regions outside of Broca’s area (and notably the RLPFC) in some deductive 
reasoning studies (i.e., the idea that these regions may respond to working memory load). 
However, the fact remains that an increase in deductive reasoning complexity is typically 
associated with an increase in the number of logical relations that have to be considered. 
Interestingly, even though the role of the RLPFC in high-order cognition remains unclear, two 
major theories posit that this region supports the integration of multiple relations when making 
a decision (Bunge, Helskog, & Wendelken, 2009; Krawczyk, Michelle McClelland, & 
Donovan, 2010; Wendelken, Nakhabenko, Donohue, Carter, & Bunge, 2008), as well as the 
ability to maintain in mind a main goal while working towards secondary goals (Koechlin, 
Corrado, Pietrini, & Grafman, 2000; Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003; Ramnani & Owen, 
2004). Complex deductive arguments often involve dealing with multiple logical relations 
while working towards finding a valid conclusion. In other words, complex deductive 
arguments often require greater relational integration and cognitive branching than simple 
arguments. This may explain the involvement of the RLPFC in those tasks. In contrast, simple 
deductive arguments (e.g., Modus Ponens) are straightforward and should rely on the 
instantiation of one single rule according to the Mental Logic (see Table 2). Unlike the kind of 
arguments that are typically used in studies that focus on deductive complexity (and in which 
activity in the RLPFC is often found), simple deductive arguments are also routinely used in 
verbal and written discourse. It is possible that these arguments might have gained – either 
through ontogeny or phylogeny -- a form of automaticity that makes their underlying syntax 
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similar to that of a natural language. In other words, it is possible that simple and complex 
deductive arguments may rely on qualitatively different mechanisms, with only the former 
involving the neural substrates of linguistic syntax. This, however, remains to be formally 
demonstrated.  
 
Conclusion 
The question of whether language and deductive reasoning rely on similar syntactic 
mechanisms is fascinating because it informs on the broader and fundamental question of 
whether human thought is embedded in natural language (Monti, 2017). It is also relevant to 
the reasoning literature because theories have long posited that deductive reasoning might rely 
on a system of formal rules of inference that can be compared to the linguistic syntax. This 
probably explains why the study of the relationship between deductive reasoning and 
language has been at the heart of the neuroimaging literature on reasoning. To date, however, 
there is no clear evidence that deductive reasoning relies on the neural mechanisms 
supporting the syntax of language. That is, even though there is support for the idea that some 
deductive tasks may recruit Broca’s area, experimental shortcomings (e.g., baseline 
conditions that are not matched for reading demands and lack of independent localization of 
mechanisms supporting the syntax of language) makes it difficult to clearly interpret these 
findings in terms of overlap between the neural mechanisms for deduction and language. On 
the contrary, the few studies that have explicitly compared the neural correlates of deductive 
reasoning to that of language have found largely separated neural networks. It is interesting to 
note, however, that studies that have found reasoning-related activity outside of Broca’s area 
have largely investigated deductive arguments that are more complex (e.g., involves the 
integration of more logical relations) than studies that have found reasoning-related activity in 
Broca’s area. Thus, it is possible that the involvement of the neural mechanisms supporting 
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linguistic syntax in deductive reasoning may be task-dependent and restricted to simple 
inferences such as those highlighted in Table 2. A potentially fruitful approach in future 
studies may then be to investigate the interaction between deductive reasoning and linguistic 
processing in Broca’s area while (i) systematically varying the complexity of the deductive 
argument and (ii) independently localizing the syntactic mechanisms of language. 
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Figures 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Typical paradigm used to investigate the neural bases of deductive reasoning. 
Premises and conclusion are presented sequentially. Brain activity is measured either upon the 
presentation of the second premise (P) or conclusion (Q). 
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Figure 2. Distribution of activation peaks in studies employing relatively simple propositional 
(or categorial) arguments (red) and studies employing relatively complex propositional 
arguments (blue) in the left frontal cortex. Coordinates of studies employing relatively simple 
arguments are taken from Reverberi and colleagues (Baggio et al., 2016; Reverberi et al., 
2012; Reverberi et al., 2010; Reverberi et al., 2007) while coordinates of studies employing 
relatively complex arguments are taken from Monti and colleagues (Coetzee & Monti, 2018; 
Monti et al., 2007; Monti et al., 2009). A yellow outline delineates Broca’s area, defined as 
Brodmann areas 44 and 45 according to the cytoarchitectonic map of Amunts et al. (1999). 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1. Examples of deductive arguments as a function of their logical form 
Logical form Example 
Modus Ponens Premise 1: If there is a circle then there is a triangle 
Premise 2: There is a circle 
Conclusion: Therefore, there is a triangle 
Modus Tollens Premise 1: If there is a circle then there is a triangle 
Premise 2: There is not a triangle 
Conclusion: Therefore, there is not a circle 
Disjunction elimination Premise 1: There is a circle or there is a triangle 
Premise 2: There is not a circle 
Conclusion: Therefore, there is a triangle 
Relational argument Premise 1: The circle is larger the triangle 
Premise 2: The triangle is larger the square 
Conclusion: Therefore, the circle is larger than the square 
Categorical Argument Premise 1: All tables are triangles 
Premise 2: All triangles are blue 
Conclusion: Therefore, all tables are blue 
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Table 2. The 12 elementary rules (i.e., schemas) from the Mental Logic 
Schema Premises Conclusion 
1 Not not-P P 
2 If P or Q then R; P P 
3 P or Q; not P Q 
4 Not both P and Q; P Not-Q 
5 P or Q; If P then R; If Q then R R 
6 P or Q; If P then R; If Q then S R or S 
7 If P then Q; P Q 
8 P; Q P and Q 
9 P and Q P 
10 P and (Q or R) (P and Q) or (P and R) 
11 P and not-P Incompatibility 
12 P or Q; Not-P; Not-Q Incompatibility 
 
